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Abstract 
This paper develops a simple calculus for 
order of magnitude reasoning. A seman­
tics is given with soundness and complete­
ness results. Order of magnitude probabil­
ity functions are easily defined and turn out 
to be equivalent to kappa functions, which 
are slight generalisations of Spohn's Natu­
ral Conditional Functions. The calculus also 
gives rise to an order of magnitude deci­
sion theory, which can be used to justify an 
amended version of Pearl's decision theory for 
kappa functions, although the latter is weaker 
and less expressive. 
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1 Introduction 
Order of magnitude reasoning is a common and impor­
tant form of reasoning. This paper develops a simple 
formal calculus for such reasoning, giving a semantics 
for it, in terms of a new theory of infinitesimals, with 
soundness and completeness results. This is applied 
to develop order of magnitude probabilistic reasoning, 
in particular, an order of magnitude decision theory 
(partly inspired by that given in (Pearl, 93]). Such a 
theory might be used in an application where the infor­
mation is of poor quality, so an expert may be happier 
just giving these very rough indications of probabilities 
and utilities. 
Section 2 describes the mathematical construction 
(from (Wilson, 95]) of a new non-standard probabil­
ity theory, building on ideas of Pearl (93b] and Gold­
szmidt (92]. Extended reals JR• are defined to be ra­
tional functions in parameter �, which is considered to 
be a very small unknown positive real number. Ex­
tended Probability and utility functions are defined in 
the usual way, except that they now can take values in 
JEt. A serious problem with theories of infinitesimal 
probability is that it can be hard to say what these new 
values mean. However, section 3 (based on section 3 
of (Wilson, 95]) shows how this theory overcomes the 
problem, giving a meaning to infinitesimal values of 
probability. 
Section 4 introduces the order of magnitude calculus 
JR0• For each integer n we have an element ( +, n ) 
meaning 'of order �n ', and an element (- , n ) mean­
ing 'of order -�n '. If we add something of order �n to 
something of order -�n then the result can be of order 
±�m for any m 2:: n: to ensure closure of the calculus 
under addition we therefore add element (0, n ) repre­
senting this set of possibilities. The operations on JR• 
induce operations on JR0; we explore the properties of 
this algebraic structure, and show how calculations can 
be performed within JR0• Section 5 gives the semantics 
in terms of sets of extended reals, with soundness and 
completeness results for the calculus. 
In section 6, order of magnitude probabilities and util­
ities are defined; the probability functions are equiva­
lent to kappa functions, which are a slight generalisa­
tion of Spohn's Natural Conditional Functions (NCFs) 
(Spohn, 90), so the results of sections 3 and 5 can be 
used to give a formal semantics for kappa functions. 
An order of magnitude decision theory is constructed 
in section 7, and a completeness result given. The 
decision theory for kappa functions in (Pearl, 93a] is 
discussed, and partially justified by the results of this 
paper. 
2 Extended Reals and Probability 
This section constructs Extended Probability by first 
extending JR by adding an infinitesimal element �, to 
form a new number system JR• and then defining prob­
ability in the usual way. 
2.1 The Extended Reals R• 
Let the Extended Reals JR• be JR(�), the field of ra­
tional functions in (dummy variable) � over the field 
JR (Maclane and Birkhoff, 79, page 122]. Each ele-
ment of JR: can be written as a pair plq where p and 
q are polynomial functions in �, and plq represents 
the same element of JR: as r Is if and only if ps is the 
same polynomial as q r. IFf' clearly contains a copy of 
JR: for x E JR, the ratio of constant polynomials xl1 
is in m•' and we'll denote this element of m• also by 
X. In particular the element 0 of m· is the function 
which has constant value 0. 
Every non-zero element r of m• can be uniquely ex­
pressed as r�1 r', where r E lR \ {0}, r is in Z, the 
set of integers, and r1 E m• is such that r'(O) = 1. 
Define 6 = oo. The function r f-+ r gives the order of 
magnitude (in terms of powers of �) of element r of 
m·. 
2.2 The Ordering on R: 
If r = pI q E m• where p' q are polynomials in �' then' 
for x E JR, r(x) (the value of r when x is substituted 
for �) is a real number, if q (x) f. 0. � is intended to be 
a very small positive number, so we define r > s iff r is 
bigger than B for small enough �: for r, B E m•' define 
relation > by r > s if and only there exists strictly 
positive real number y such that r(x) > s(x) for all 
real x with 0 < x < y. Relations <, � and :::; are 
defined from relation > in the usual way, e.g. , r :::; s if 
and only if s > r or s = r. 
We have r > s if and only if r - s > 0, and (i) r, s > 
0 implies r + s > 0 and rs > 0, and (ii) for each 
r E m•, exactly one of the following hold: (a) r > 0, 
(b) r = 0, (c) -r > 0. Therefore m• is an ordered 
field [Maclane and Birkhoff, 79, p261]. However, it 
lacks the completeness property, that every subset of 
positive elements has a greatest lower bound (consider, 
for example, the (copy of t he) positive real numbers in 
m•). Thus m• is not a non-standard model of the 
reals in the sense of Robinson's theory of hyperreals 
[Stroyan and Luxemburg, 76]. It is however isomorphic 
to a subset of the hyperreals, using the monomorphism 
m generated by m(x) = x for x E lR and m(�) = �� 
where �� is any positive infinitesimal. 
Though they are defined as functions, elements of m• 
should be thought of as numbers; � is a positive num­
ber smaller than any strictly positive real number, e2 
is an even smaller positive number, e - e2 is between 
two, though much closer toe, and so on. 
2.3 Extended Probability Theory 
To define Extended Probability and Utility, the usual 
definitions suffice, except using m• instead of JR. Let 
!.1 be a finite set, which is intended to represent a set 
of mutually exclusive and exhaustive events. An Ex­
tended Utility function on !.1 is a function from !.1 to 
m•. 
Let R be a set containing distinguished elements 0 and 
1 with binary operation + and relation :::; on it, and 
binary operation I defined on all pairs r E R, s E R' 
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where R' � R. Define an R-valued probability func­
tion P over !.1 to be a function from 2° to R satisfying 
(i) P(0) = 0; P(!.l) = 1 
(ii) for A, B � !.1 such that An B = 0, P(A U B) = 
P(A) + P(B). 
(iii) if A �  B then P(A):::; P(B). 
For R-valued probability function P over !.1 and A, B � 
!.1 with P(B) E R', the conditional probability P(AJB) 
is defined to be the value P(A n B)IP(B). 
JR- valued probability functions are just the usual prob­
ability functions (with R' = lR \ {0}). Define Ex­
tended Probability functions to be m• - valued proba­
bility functions (with R' = m• \ {0}). It can easily 
be checked that extended probability functions take 
values in (0 ,  1r = {r E m• : 0:::; r:::; 1}. 
3 Interpretation of Extended 
Probability 
It is very important to be able to ascribe meaning to 
values of probability and utility. Clearly if an agent 
is going to sensibly make probability statements such 
as Pr( A) = r, it is necessary that she understands 
what this means. Also, Extended Probability theory 
will be used to give a semantics to order of magni­
tude probability theory and Spohn's NCFs; the value 
of this semantics is heavily dependent on how strong 
a semantics can be given to Extended Probability the­
ory. The issues are discussed in [Wilson, 95], and are 
reviewed here. 
To justify the ordering used on the extended reals is 
fairly straight-forward. The value e is considered to be 
an unknown small positive real number; the ordering 
given is the only sensible one given that we want m• 
to be an ordered field; [Wilson, 95, 3.1] justifies the 
ordering axiomatically. 
The axioms of Extended Probability can be justified by 
adapting the Dutch book argument [de Finetti, 74] or 
Cox's axioms [Cox, 46]; alternatively, we can view an 
Extended Probability function P as a family of prob­
ability functions {Pr,} indexed by parameter e rang­
ing over a positive neighbourhood (in JR) of 0 (this 
is closely related to Convergent PPDs in [Goldszmidt, 
92]), and use standard justifications of (real-valued) 
Bayesian probability (see [Wilson, 95, 3.2]). 
Interpretation of Probability and Utility 
Values 
We will indicate how an agent could (in theory at least) 
use a sequence of thought experiments to give meaning 
to an assignment 'Pr(A) = r' for arbitrary events A 
and for Extended Reals r between 0 and 1. We will 
assume that an agent knows what Pr( A) = x means 
for real value :r: E [ 0, 1], using a standard justification 
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of Bayesian probability, either by comparison with a 
chance experiment (e.g. [Shafer, 81]) or a Dutch book 
argument (e.g., [de Finetti, 74] ).1 
The agent first imagines some (possible) event E of 
unknown small probability, and calls this value �. This 
step is arbitrary to quite a large extent; however once 
this has been chosen, the agent must stick with it for 
the problem at hand. 
Suppose (inductively) that the agent knows what
.
Prob­
ability values of r and s mean where r, s E [ 0, 1] , and 
suppose (without loss of generality) that r ::::; s. To un­
derstand the meaning of a probability of r s ,  the agent 
imagines two independent events A and B with prob­
abilities r and s respectively; A n B has probability 
rs. 
If she imagines events C and D with C � D and prob­
abilities r and s respectively then the value s - r is 
the probability of event D \ C and the value r / s is the 
probability of event C, conditional on D being true. 
For r, s with r + s :::=; 1, the agent should imagine mu­
tually exclusive F and G with probabilities r and s 
respectively; then an event should be assigned a prob­
ability value of r + s if and only if it is considered 
equiprobable to F U G. 
It turns out that any r E [ 0, 1 r can be reached using 
these rules, so by making a sequence of such thought 
experiments, using qualitative judgements, an agent 
can calibrate any of the possible values of Extended 
Probability. 
Meaning must be given to Extended Real values of 
utility. We start off by assuming that an agent has, 
as usual, decided what 1 utile means (an arbitrary 
choice). Then for r E JEt with r 2: 0, the agent imag­
ines event A with probability ,�1 such that if A occurs 
the agent loses 1 utile, and if A occurs the agent gains 
some prize Q. r utiles is defined to be the value of a 
prize Q which is just sufficiently large to ensure that 
she expects not to l ose in this situation (so that the 
expected utility is 0). Negative values of utility are cal­
ibrated with a similar thought experiment, but where 
the agent gains 1 utile if A occurs. 
4 The Order of Magnitude Calculus 
We will develop a calculus which can used for reasoning 
about the orders of magnitude of extended reals. This 
will be used to generate an order of magnitude theory 
of probability and utility. 
1The reader may not find justifications of Bayesian 
probability particularly convincing, and may consider that 
much more general measures of belief are rational (e.g., 
[Walley, 91; Shafer, 81]). I would agree, but we obviously 
cannot hope to give a stronger justification of Extended 
Probability than there is of Bayesian probability; 
4.1 Orders of Magnitude and their Meanings 
Let JR0 = { ( 0', n) : n E Z, 0' E { +, -, 0} } U { ( 0, oo)}, 
where Z is the set of integers. The element (0, oo) will 
sometimes be written as 0, element ( +, 0) as 1, and 
element ( -, 0) as -1. Define function JR• � JR0 by 
0 - { (sign(r ), r) if r =P 0 r�r - 0 ifr= O 
where sign(r) = + if r > 0 and sign(r) = - if r < 0. 
The element ( +, n) will be used for reasoning about 
elements r of JR• of positive sign and of order �n, i.e. , 
r such that r0 = (+,n), for example �n and 3�n i��. 
Similarly ( -, n) represents r such that r0 = ( -, n), 
e.g., -2�n. Note that the operation r � r0 is not 
onto; the image is the set ( JR0 \ JR�) U { 0} where JR� = 
{ (0, n) : n E Z U { oo} }. 
If r0 = (+, n) and s0 = ( -,n) then (r+ s)0 could be 
0, (+,m) or ( -, m) for any m 2: n. For example, if 
r = �n and s = -2�n then r0 = (+,n), S0 = (-, n) and 
(r+ s)0 = ( -,n); if, however, s = -�n then (r+ s) " = 
0. This is the reason that we included elements (0, n) 
in JR0: to ensure that JR0 is closed under addition. 
(O, n) is intended to represent elements r of JR• with 
f 2: n. 
Thus elements of /R0 are interpreted as representing 
certain subsets of JR". For a E JR0 we define subset 
a• of JR" which will be viewed as the 'meaning' of a. 
The calculus we will develop for JR0 may be viewed as 
a simple way of reasoning about these subsets. 
For a E JR0 \ JR�, let a• = {r E JR• : r0 =a}. Thus, 
for n E Z, ( +, n )" is the set of positive elements of JR" 
of order n, {r : r > O,f = n}, and ( -, n)" is the set of 
negative elements of JR" of order n, {r : r < o, r = n }. 
For (O,m) E JRg, let (O, m)" = {r E JR• : r 2: m}, so 
that, for example, (0, oo )" = {0}. Elements a• for 
a E (JR0 \ /Rg) U {0} form of partition of JR•. 
4.2 The Operations on Ro 
The operations on JR• induce operations on JRo (the 
definitions are formally justified by Theorem 1 in sec­
tion 5.1). These are related to operations in Parsons' 
work on qualitative uncertainty e.g. [Parsons, 93]. 
Multiplication: For (o-,m),(o-',n) E JR0, let (o-, m)x 
(o-', n) = (o-®o-',m+ n), where oo+ m = m+oo = oo 
for m E Z U { oo }, and ® is the natural multiplication 
of signs: it is the commutative operation on { +, -, 0} 
such that+®-= -,+®+= -®-= +, and for 
any o- E {+, -,0}, o- ® 0 = 0. As usual, a X b will be 
sometimes abbreviated to ab. This multiplication is 
associative and commutative, and (JR0 \ JR�, x) is an 
abelian group. Also -1 X -1 = 1 and for any a E JRo, 
a X 0 = 0 and a X 1 = a. 
For b E /R0 \ JRg define b-1 to be the multiplica­
tive inverse of b, and for a E JR0 let a/b = a X b-1. 
(o-, mt1 = (o-, -m) for 0' E {+, -}. 
Addition: For (q,m),(0"1,n) E JR0, let 
{ (0', m) 
( 0', m) + ( 0'1, n) = ( 0'1, n) 
(0' $ 0''' m) 
if m < n; 
if m > n; 
if m = n 
where +$+= +, -$-= -, and otherwise, 0'$0'1 = 
0. 
Addition is associative and commutative, and a+O = a 
for any a E JR0• We have distributivity: for a, b, c E 
JR0, (a + b )c = ac + be. 
For a,b E JRo let -b = -1xb, and a-b = a+(-b). We 
have -(0', m) = ( -(0'), m) where, as one would expect, 
-(+) = - ,  -(-)= + and -(0)= 0. If a,b,c,dE 
JRo d b d d JRo th a _ ad a + c _ a+c a + c _ an ' 'I' en T - Td' T b - -b- ' b J -adb�bc, and � -] = adbdbc. The above properties mean 
that arithmetic expressions in JR0 can be manipulated 
in many of the ways that arithmetic expressions in 
JR can; for example, we shall see in section 7.1 that 
order of magnitude expectation has the usual linearity 
properties. However (JR0, 0, 1, +, x) is not a field, or 
even a ring, because additive inverses do not exist; 
for example, 1 + -1 = (0, 0) which is not equal to 
O=(O,oo). 
4.3 Ordering 
Define (q,m) > 0 iff 0' = +, and (q,m) > (q,n) iff 
(q,m) - (q,n) > 0. 
We have that for a, bE JR0, a> 0 if and only if O > -a, 
and a,b > 0 implies that a+ b > 0 and ab > 0. > is 
a transitive relation, but is not a total order since, for 
example, we have neither (0, 0) > -1 nor (0, 0) < -1. 
Unfortunately, it is possible that a > b and c > 0 
hold but a + c > b + c does not hold. For example, 
if a= 1,b = O, c = -1 then a > b but a+ c = (0, 0) 
which is not greater than b + c = -1 = ( -, 0); the 
reason for this is that one of the elements that (0, 0) 
represents (e.g., -2 E JR•) is smaller than one of the 
elements that (-, 0) represents (e.g. , -1 E JEt). 
5 Interpretation of the Order of 
Magnitude Calculus 
Here we give a precise semantics for the order of mag­
nitude calculus. The meaning of elements (and hence 
subsets) of JR• is given above. As stated there, each 
element a of lR0 will be viewed as a representation of 
the set a• � JR•. Thus order of magnitude statements 
are interpreted as statements about JR•. Extended 
real r E a• will be described as an interpretation of 
a. Each a E lR0 is considered to be representing some 
unknown interpretation r E JR•. 
We will show that the calculus is sound and complete 
in a particular sense. Roughly speaking, soundness 
will mean that any computation in the order of mag­
nitude calculus is correct when viewed as a statement 
about subsets of JR•; completeness will mean that the 
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calculus is as strong as it could be. For example, 
suppose that for particular elements a, b, c, d E lR0, 
(a+ b)/c > c - d holds; we will show that for all in­
terpretations r of a, s of b, i and u of c and v of d, 
(r + s )/-t > u- v (note that we should not assume that 
the two instances of c in the first equation represent 
the same unknown element of JR•). If this were not 
the case then the order of magnitude calculus would 
be making unwarranted conclusions. This is a sound­
ness result for the order of magnitude calculus. Con­
versely, if for all interpretations r of a, s of b, i and u 
of c and v of d, ( r + s)/i > u - v, then we have that 
(a + b)/ c > c - d. If this were not the case then the 
order of magnitude calculus would be weaker than it 
ideally should be. This is a completeness result. 
5.1 Representation Within Algebra of 
Subsets of R• 
For 5, T � JR• and U � JR• \ {0}, define 
5 + T  
5T 
-5 
u-1 
{s + i : s E 5, i E T} 
{si : s E 5, i E T} 
{ -s : s E 5} 
{u-1 : u E U} 
Define relation > on subsets of JR• by 5 > T if and 
only if for all s E 5 and i E T, s > i. 
(5T will sometimes be (implicitly) referred to as 5 x 
T, although this notation is used as little as possible 
to avoid confusion with product sets.) The following 
result justifies the operations in the order of magnitude 
calculus. 
Theorem 1 
For a,b,c E JR0 with c ¢ JR�, 
(i) a E JR� <¢:=} a• 3 0; 
(ii) (a+b)" = a• + b•, (ab)" = a•b•, ( -a)" =  - (a•) , 
(c-1)" = (c•t1; 
(iii) a = b <¢:=} a• = b•, and a > b <¢:=} a• > b•. 
In other words, the structures (lR0, +, X, >) and 
( { a• : a E lR0}, +, x, >) are isomorphic, with isomor­
phism a t-t a•. 
The proof is tedious but straight-forward. One might 
imagine that all the important properties of the order 
of magnitude calculus can be derived from those of 
subsets of JR•. This is not the case; we are fortunate 
that the very valuable distributivity property holds in 
the order of magnitude calculus, and hence in the cal­
culus of the corresponding subsets of JR•, since it does 
not hold for arbitrary subsets of JR•; for example, if 
5 = T = {1}, U = {1,2}, then (5 + T)U = {2}U = 
{2,4}, but 5U + TU = U + U = {2,3,4}. 
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5.2 Completeness Results for Arithmetic 
Statements 
We will construct arithmetic formulae based on set of 
symbols X = {x1, x:h ... }. Define the set of arithmetic 
formulae .A to be the smallest set of strings of symbols 
such that 
(i) for all i = 1 , 2, . . .  , the symbol x; is in .A; x; is 
said to have symbol set { x;}; 
(ii) if <p, 1/1 E .A with symbol sets Y and Z respectively, 
and Y n Z = 0, then the following (strings of 
symbols) are in .A: ( - <p) and (<p-1), which both 
have symbol set Y, ( <p + 1/1) and ( <p X 1/1) which 
both have symbol set Y U Z. 
For example, (x2 + ( - (x1 X x3))) is an arithmetic for­
mula with symbol set {x1, x2, x3}. Note that each 
symbol x; can appear at most once in an arithmetic 
formula. 
Consider some tuple R = (R, R', +, x, -(·), (-)-1), 
where R is a set, R' � R, + and x are binary op­
erations on R, -( ·) is a function from R to R, and 
(.)-1 is a function from R' to R. 
An instantiation !! in R for arithmetic formula <p is 
a function from Y to R, where Z � Y � X and Z 
is the symbol set of <p. <p(!!) is then defined to be 
the value of the arithmetic expression <p when symbol 
x; is replaced by f!( x;) for each x; E Z. Formally 
it is defined inductively as follows: x;(!!) = f!(x;), 
(<p + �/�)(!!) = <p(f!) + �/�(_!!), (<p X ljl)(!!) = <p(f!) X 1/1(!!), 
( -<p )(!!) = - ( <p(f!))' and ( <p -1 )(!!) = ( <p(!!) r 1 if 
<p(f!) E R', and ( <p-1 )(!!) equals the string 'undefined' 
otherwise. 
The definition allows us to instantiate different sym­
bols x; and xJ with the same value r E R. For ex­
ample, if <p = (x2 + ( - (x1 X x3))), R = JRo, and 
_!!(xi)= f!(x2) = (-,2), f!(x3) = (+,0) (= 1), then 
<p(f!) = ( -,2) + (- ( ( -,2) X 1)) = ( -,2) + (+,2) = 
(0, 2). 
For arithmetic formula <p and instantiation !! : Y -+ 
JR0 we say that r. : Y -+ JR• is an interpretation of!! 
(sometimes abbreviated to 'r. is of !!') if for all x; E Y, 
r.(x;) E (!!(x;)r, i.e. , if each component of r. is an 
interpretation of each component of !!· Clearly, r. is 
an instantiation in JR• for <p. Also define instantia-
tion !!• in 2JR
. 
by !!•(x;) = (!!(x;)r for each x; E Y; 
naturally, for R = JR0, we define R' to be JR0 \ JR�, 
for R = JR•, R' = JR• \ {0}, and for R = 2JR• , 
R' = {U : U � JR• \ {0} }. 
Theorem 2 
Let !! and !! be instantiations in JR0 for arithmetic for­
mulae <p and 1/1, respectively. Then 
(i) <p(!!) =undefined {:::::::} <p(!!•) =undefined {:::::::} 
for some interpretation r. of Q., <p(r.) = undefined; 
(ii) when <p(f!) f; undefined the following equivalences 
hold: <p(!!) = 1/1(!!) {:::::::} <p(f!•) = ¢(f) {:::::::} 
{<p(r.) : r. is of !!}= {1/1(.!) : .! is of Q}; 
(iii) <p(!!) > �/!(!!) {:::::::} <p(!!•) > 1/!(f) {:::::::} for all 
interpretations r. of Q., and .! of !!. <p(r.) > lj! (.!). 
(iii) can be viewed as a soundness and completeness 
result for the order of magnitude calculus; any strict 
inequality statement that can be deduced in the or­
der of magnitude calculus is true when viewed as a 
statement about the extended reals (soundness); con­
versely, any strict inequality statement in the order 
of magnitude calculus which is true when viewed as a 
statement in the extended reals, can be deduced in the 
order of magnitude calculus (completeness). 
6 Order of Magnitude 
Probability /Utility 
To define order of magnitude probability and utility, 
we use, as before, the standard definitions, except us­
ing JR0 instead of JR. 
An order of magnitude utility function on Q is a func­
tion from n to JR0• 
An order of magnitude probability function P over Q is 
defined to be an JR0 -valued probability function (with 
R' = JR0 \ JR�; see definition of R-valued probability 
function in section 2. 3). 
6.1 The Meaning of Order of Magnitude 
Probability 
If I is a function from some set W to JR0 then 
g: W -+ JR• is said to be an interpretation of I if 
for all wE W, g(w) E (/(w)r. If g happens also to 
be an extended probability function then we say that 
g is a probabilistic interpretation of I. 
Each order of magnitude probability function P over Q 
has a probabilistic interpretation; for example we can 
define extended probability function R by R( w) = 0 if 
P(w) = 0 and R(w) =a.!", for P(w) = (+,n), where 
a is a normalisation constant (and then we extend R 
by additivity to 2° ). Conversely, each extended prob­
ability function R is a probabilistic interpretation for 
exactly one order of magnitude probability function 
R0 given by R"(A) = (R(A)) " ; also for all A, B � Q 
with R0(B) � JR�, R0(AiB) = (R(AIB)) " . Similar 
comments apply for utility. 
This means that an order of magnitude probability 
function P may be viewed as a representation of a set 
of extended probability functions, i. e., its probabilistic 
interpretations, which were given meaning in section 3 
and in [Wilson, 95]. 
Thus if P(A) = (+, 1) then we judge the probability 
of A to be of the same order as the calibrating event 
E (see section 3.3); if P(B) = ( +, n) we judge the 
probability of B be of the same order as n independent 
events, each of which has probability equal to that of 
E. 
6.2 Kappa Functions 
A kappa function over n is defined to be a function 
"': 2° --+ IN U { oo} such that 
(i) K-(0) = oo; K(rl) = 0; 
(ii) for A,B � n such that An B = 0, K(A u B)= 
min (K(A), K(B)). 
For kappa function "' over Q and A, B � Q such that 
K(B) =P oo, the conditional value K(AIB) is defined to 
be K-(A n B)- K-(B). 
Kappa functions are a slight generalisation of Spohn's 
NCFs [Spohn, 88, 90], in that a non-empty set A can 
be assigned value oo, meaning 'A is impossible'; they 
have been used, for example, in [Goldszmidt and Pearl, 
91; Goldszmidt, 92; Pearl, 93a,b]. They are also closely 
related to Zadeh's possibility functions [Dubois and 
Prade, 88]; the mapping"' f-+ 2-" gives an embedding 
of kappa functions into the set of possibility measures. 
The values of an order of magnitude probability func­
tion are all contained in [ 0, 1 ]" = { ( +, m) : m � 0} U 
{0}. This set is totally ordered by > ,  and in fact 
([ 0,1 ]",+,x,>) can be seen to be isomorphic to 
(IN U { oo}, min , +, <). Using this isomorphism, it is 
easy to see that order of magnitude probability func­
tions are just kappa functions, with their values la­
belled differently; also definitions of conditional val­
ues K(AIB) and P(AIB) can be seen to be equivalent. 
This means that the justification above for order of 
magnitude probabilities also justifies kappa functions. 
Of course, this justification is closely related to stan­
dard justifications in terms of infinitesimal probabili­
ties such as (Spohn, 90], but I think that it is stronger 
since it is based on a more meaningful theory of in­
finitesimal probability (see section 3). The justifica­
tion also benefits logics such as Adams' [66,75] which 
can be given semantics in terms of kappa functions (see 
e.g., [Goldszmidt, 92]). 
7 Order of Magnitude Decision 
Theory 
This section shows how the definitions for order of 
magnitude probability and utility lead to an order of 
magnitude decision theory, and the relationship with 
the decision theory for kappa functions in [Pearl, 93a] 
is discussed. 
7.1 Expectation 
Expectation for order of magnitude probability func­
tions can be defined in the usual way, and turns out 
to have the usual linearity properties. 
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Proposition 
Let P be an order of magnitude probability function 
over n, and let U and V be order of magnitude utility 
functions on n. Define P(U), the expected value of U 
with respect to P, to be LwEO P(w)U(w) (note that 
the summation sign makes sense because of the com­
mutativity and associativity of addition in lR0). For 
,\ E IE?", let U). be the constant function on Q which 
takes value ,\, Then, 
(i) P(U + V) = P(U) + P(V); 
(ii) P( -U) = -P(U); 
(iii) P(U).) = ,\, 
(iv) P(,\U) = ,\P(U), 
where, as usual, addition and scalar multiplication 
of the order of magnitude utility functions is defined 
pointwise. 
This result follows easily from the properties of the 
order of magnitude calculus given in section 4.2. 
Let P and U be an order of magnitude probability 
and utility function on Q, respectively. Let 0' = 
{wE Q : P(w) =j; 0}. For w E 0' let us write P(w) 
as (+, K(w)) and U(w) as (u (w), m(w)). Then, P(U) 
equals 
2:P (w)U(w) = 2: (+, K(w)) (u (w),m(w)), 
wEO wEO' 
which equals (+, u+)+(O,u0)+( -,u-) = (u, u) where, 
for X E {+, - , 0}, uX = min.,EO':cr(w)= x (K(w )+m(w)) 
(the operator min taken over the empty set is defined 
to have value oo), u = min(u+,u0,u-), and 
{ 
+ if u+ < u0,u-; 
u= - if u- <u0,u+; 
0 otherwise. 
7.2 Comparison of Expected Utility 
Suppose we are comparing two options with associated 
order of magnitude probability and utility functions 
P;, U; for i = 1, 2. Option 1 is strictly preferred to 
option 2 if P1(Ul) > P:�(U:�). 
Theorem 3 
For i. = 1, 2, let P; be order of magnitude probability 
functions over n and U; be order of magnitude utility 
functions on n. Then P1(Ul) > P2(U:�) if and only 
if for any probabilistic interpretations R; of P; (i. = 
1, 2), and for any interpretations V; of U, (i = 1, 2), 
Rt (Vt) > R2(V2). 
This can be viewed as a soundness and completeness 
result for the order of magnitude decision theory: we 
strictly prefer option 1 to option 2 if and only if for all 
probabilistic interpretations we would do so. 
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7.3 Pearl's Decision Theory for Kappa 
Functions 
In [Pearl, 93a, section 3] a decision theory for kappa 
functions is developed. 2 The scale used for utility is 
coarser than that given here, and leads sometimes to 
conclusions being unnecessarily weak. 
Pearl's order of magnitude utility functions on n are 
functions J.' from n to Z, the set of integers. Fori > 0, 
J.'( w) = i is intended to represent values of utility of 
order 1/ �·, and thus corresponds to ( +, -i ) E lR0; 
J.'( w) = -i is. intended to represent values of utility 
of order -1/�', thus corresponds to (-,-i ) E lR0• It 
seems that J.'( w) = 0 is intended to represent values 
of utility of order + 1 or -1 or anything in between 
(i.e., constant function of� or less), so it corresponds 
to (0,0) E 1R0• 
Note that, because of the reasons given earlier, in the 
discussion on addition in lR0, the sum of J.' values 
i (> 0) and -i does not correspond to a single J.' value, 
so when such a value occurs in a calculation, it is la­
belled 'ambiguous'. Thus elements (0, -i) E lR0 for 
i > 0 are represented in Pearl's system by the value of 
'ambiguous'. 
Let K be a kappa function over n. For i = 0, 1, 2, . . .  , 
the set W/ is defined to be {wE n : J.'(w) = i }  and 
W;- is defined to be { w E n : J.'( w) = -i}. Define non­
negative integers n+ and n- by n+ = max;(O,i­
K(W/)) and n-= max; (O, i- K(wn). 
The expected utility of J.' with respect to K is then 
defined in [Pearl, 93a] to be 
{
ambiguous if n+ = n-> 0; 
n + -n- otherwise. 
As we shall shortly see, this cannot have been what 
Pearl intended; instead he probably intended the ex­
pected utility e of J.' with respect to K to be 
Example 
{ �mbiguous 
n+ 
-n-
if n+ = n-> 0; 
if n+ = n-= 0; 
if n+ > n-; 
if n+ < n-. 
Let n = {wl,w2}, and define K, by K(wl) = K(w2) = 0, 
corresponding to non-infinitesimal values of probabil­
ity, and J.' by J.'(wl) = 4, J.'(w2) = -3, which correspond 
to utilities of orders 1/ �4 and -1/ �3 respectively. Thus 
the expected utility will be of order 1/�4 - 1/�3 which 
is of order 1/ �4. We haven+ = 4, n-= 3, so the orig­
inal definition of expected value of /A with respect to K 
gives a value of 1 corresponding to expected utility of 
order 1/�, not 1/�4. 
2Pearl refers to this as a qualitative decision theory, 
and the kappa function as an ordinal belief ranking; this 
is misleading: an ordinal scale is not sufficient for kappa 
functions because the differences between values do matter, 
for conditioning and independence. 
The second definition gives the correct answer in this 
example and will be justified using the order of mag­
nitude calculus. 
As explained earlier, kappa function K corresponds to 
an order of magnitude probability function P, and, 
using the above correspondence, J.' functions can be 
viewed as order of magnitude utility functions U; for 
example �J(w) = -5 is translated to U(w) = ( -, -5) 
and �J(w) = 0 is translated to U(w) = (0,0). Thus we 
can use the results of 7.1 to give the correct expected 
value. Using the results and notation of section 7.1 we 
have P (U) = ( 0'1 u) where 0' equals 
{ 0 if u = u0 
0 if u =J u0 and u+ = u-; 
+ �f u =J u0 and u+ < u-; 
- 1f u =J u0 and u+ > u-. 
By considering some w1 E n with K(w') = 0, we can 
see that, because of the special form of U, (i) u ::; 0 
and (ii) u = u0 <=::::> u = 0 <=::::> u+, u- ;:::: 0. These 
facts enable us to eliminate mentions of u0 and u in 
the above equation. Proving that n+ = max(O, -u+) 
and n-= max(O, -u-) is straight-forward, and these 
equivalences can be used to show that P( U) equals 
ifn+=n-=0 
if n+ = n- > 0; 
ifn+>n-· 
if n+ < n-: 
When we convert the order of magnitude values into 
Pearl's !A-values we get the amended definition. 
This justifies Pearl's (amended) decision theory. Note, 
that we have just shown a soundness result; it does 
sometimes give unnecessarily weak results, as shown 
by the following example, in which we have a choice 
between two options with associated K and /A func­
tions. Let n = {wl,w2}· Fori= 1,2, let K,(wd = 
K;(w2) = 0. Let J.'1(wl) = 2 and /A2(w2) = -2, and let 
J.'2(wl) = -5 = 1J2(w2). The expected value e1 of J.'l 
with respect to K1 equals 'ambiguous', and e2 = -5 
so neither option is preferred over the other. How­
ever, the expected utility in the first option is of or­
der ±1/ �2 which is greater than the expected util­
ity of the second option, of order -1/ �5. The or­
der of magnitude calculus is able to give this con­
clusion (as we know from the completeness results): 
P1(Ul) = (0,-2) > (- , -5) = P2(U2). 
Thus, although we have given Pearl's order of magni­
tude decision theory a formal semantics, it has a num­
ber of disadvantages compared to one developed in 
this paper; it cannot represent infinitesimal utilities, 
it does not distinguish utilities of order 1, represent­
ing finite positive benefit, from utilities of order -1, 
representing finite negative benefit; also, it does not 
distinguish different grades of ambiguity, which means 
that it lacks the completeness results enjoyed by this 
paper's formalism. 
8 Discussion 
This is clearly a rather simple order of magnitude cal­
culus; it was designed to be just expressive enough 
to give a satisfactory decision theory for kappa func­
tions. There are natural ways to extend the calculus; 
we might add elements (p, n) representing the non­
negative elements of order at most n, and ( m, n) rep­
resenting the non-positive elements of order at most 
n, so that e.g., (p, n )" = {r E JR• : r :2: n, r :2: 0}. We 
might also then consider adding a squaring operation. 
The semantics of this would be given by defining for 
5 <;;; JR•, 52 = { s2 : s E 5}. (note that 52 is not 
usually equal to 55). 
More ambitious extensions might allow representations 
of statements such as 'greater than order �n ', or such 
as 'between order �" and �"' '. We could also consider 
intermediate calculi; a natural idea is to define a calcu­
lus containing pairs (A,n), where,\ E JR\ {0}, n E Z, 
representing extended reals r with r = n and r = ,\; 
however, it may be the case that we would have to 
either give up distributivity or completeness. In any 
case, the methods and concepts of this paper, particu­
larly section 5, would be useful in the analysis of these 
more sophisticated calculi. 
It would be interesting to explore applications of this 
calculus in other areas of Artificial Intelligence, in par­
ticular, Qualitative Physics and Constraint-based rea­
soning. 
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